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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD REVIEW 
I. ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that in a contractual action brought 
against a professional accounting firm the action is treated in all respects as a tort action. 
(Issue preserved R. at 373-80.) 
2. Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that an action for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is necessarily based on a breach of a tort 
duty. (Issue preserved R. at 375-77.) 
3. Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that the tort doctrine that an 
employer is not liable in respondeat superior for the illegal act of an employee is an absolute 
defense to a breach of contract action against the employer. (Issue preserved R. at 379-80.) 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment should not be granted unless, after making all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the party bringing the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co,, 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
Appellate courts "review [a] trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving 
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no particular deference to its conclusions of law." Id. The court "determine^] only whether 
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held 
that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989) (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case is a claim brought by Guardian Title Company of Utah (Guardian), against 
Stacey Mitchell, formerly known as Stacey Howell (Mitchell), alleging conversion, and 
against her employers, Tebbs & Smith (Tebbs), Douglas Rex (Rex), and Stagg & Associates 
(Stagg) alleging breaches of contract. On September 15, 2000, Stagg filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine asserting that it was 
entitled to summary judgment because (1) Stagg did not breach an agreement with Guardian, 
(2) Guardian's claim is a tort claim, which is barred by Guardian's own negligence, and (3) 
Guardian's claim is a tort claim, which is barred by agency principles. On September 19, 
2000, Rex joined Stagg's motion, and on September 29,2000, Tebbs joined Stagg's motion. 
Both joinders were filed after the court-ordered dispositive motion deadline, and, thus, 
Guardian objected to them. 
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After oral argument held on October 25, 2000, the trial court granted, inter alia, 
summary judgment for Stagg, Tebbs, and Rex based upon "the reasons advanced by Stagg," 
and denied Guardian's motion to strike Tebbs' and Mr. Rex's joinders. An order was then 
entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on November 15,2000, granting partial summary judgment 
to Stagg, Tebbs, and Rex. (A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum.) 
Pursuant to agreement between Guardian, Ms. Mitchell, and Stagg, a stipulated judgment 
against Ms. Mitchell and in favor of Guardian was entered on March 15, 2001. (A copy of 
the stipulated judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit B to the Addendum.) Guardian and 
Stagg have settled all outstanding claims between them and an order of dismissal of 
Guardian's claims against Stagg was also entered by the Court on March 15, 2001. (A copy 
of the Order of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit C to the Addendum.) The Notice of 
Appeal was filed on March 22, 2001. 
This appeal is from the order entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on November 15, 
2000, granting summary judgment to Tebbs and Rex. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the mid-1970s, Guardian entered into an agreement with Tebbs in which Tebbs 
agreed to provide professional accounting services for Guardian. (R. at 182, 210.) From 
approximately 1983, those services included the preparation of checks made payable to 
Guardian's employees and drawn on Guardian's bank checking account (Payroll Account), 
the performance of account statement reconciliation services with regard to the Payroll 
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Account, the preparation of payroll tax reports, and the making of bank deposits of 
withholding, payroll, social security, and other taxes. (R. at 3, 37-38, 182-83, 210.) 
Guardian paid Tebbs monthly for Tebbs' services. (R. at 182.) Rex was Guardian's contact 
at Tebbs from approximately 1983 or 1984 until October 1997. (Id.) During that time, 
employees under Mr. Rex's supervision were given the responsibility to calculate the amount 
to be paid each Guardian employee and to prepare the Guardian payroll checks. (R. at 211.) 
In 1995, Mitchell, a Tebbs' employee, was given the responsibility to handle Guardian's 
payroll. (R. at 183.) At that time Stacey Mitchell used the name Stacey Howell, which was 
her married name from December 1985 to August 1988. (Id.) 
In about 1996, Guardian began providing blank payroll checks to Tebbs that were pre-
signed by Douglas Curlis, Guardian's president and owner, and which Tebbs then prepared 
for delivery to Guardian's employees. (Id.) Under this arrangement, Tebbs, who kept the 
blank checks at its offices, delivered blank checks to Guardian, which Mr. Curlis, who lived 
in St. George, would sign, and then return to Tebbs. (R. at 184.) Tebbs would then fill in the 
appropriate names and amounts on the checks and return the checks to Guardian to distribute 
to Guardian employees, pursuant to a list Guardian had prepared which included the 
employees to be paid and the amount to be paid to them. (R. at 212.) At a later date, 
Guardian also implemented a signature stamp procedure for the payroll checks. (R. at 184-
85.) Under this arrangement, if Mr. Curlis was in Salt Lake City to sign the payroll checks, 
he would do so. (R. at 185.) However, if he was not in Salt Lake, Guardian would pick up 
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the checks from Tebbs, and one of Guardian's employees would pre-stamp the blank payroll 
checks and return them to Tebbs to there be completed. (Id.) 
In 1997, Rex left Tebbs and began to work on his own. (R. at 189.) Mitchell soon 
thereafter left Tebbs and began working for Mr. Rex. (R. at 190.) In October 1997, 
Guardian shifted its accounting services from Tebbs to Mr. Rex. (Id.) Mr. Rex assumed all 
Guardian's accounting services, including payroll, taxes, and the other services Tebbs had 
provided. (Id.) No procedures changed for the handling of the Payroll Account. (Id.) 
On December 15, 1997, Ms. Mitchell went to work for Stagg & Associates (Stagg). 
(R. at 191.) At the same time, Guardian changed its accounting services from Rex to Stagg. 
(Id.) Soon thereafter Guardian discovered that during the time that Mitchell handled the 
Payroll Account, she prepared and drew forty-seven checks on that account made payable 
to "Stacey Howell:" the first of which was dated September 20,1996, the last dated in March 
1998. (R. at 192-93, 216-17.) Each of the checks were endorsed with the name "Stacey 
Howell" and deposited to her bank account. (R. at 193.) During the time that Mitchell was 
employee at Tebbs there were thirty-five of these checks written and drawn on the Payroll 
Account. (R. at 245-91, 464, 6.) During her employment with Mr. Rex, there were three 
checks drawn on the Payroll Account. (R. at 245-91,464, 6.) During her employment with 
Stagg, there were nine checks drawn on the Payroll Account. (R. at 193.) 
On April 14, 1999, Guardian filed the complaint in this action against Ms. Mitchell 
alleging conversion, and against Tebbs, Rex, and Stagg alleging breaches of contract. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Rex and Tebbs by coming 
to several incorrect conclusions. The trial court misinterpreted Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), 
when the court held that Kilpatrick required that it engage in a negligence analysis, even foi 
breach of contract claims, in determining questions of law before it. Kilpatrick very clearly 
recognizes that three separate causes of action arise in professional malpractice settings: (1) 
breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) negligence. In fact, Kilpatrick 
specifically recognized that breach of contract causes of action are conceptually distinct from 
breaches of fiduciary duty and negligence causes of action. Kilpatrick*s recognition of these 
separate and distinct causes of action is consistent with the law of this and other jurisdictions. 
The trial court, therefore, incorrectly applied a negligence analysis to Guardian's contract 
claims. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing was a tort duty and that Guardian's assertion of the covenant would give rise to new 
and independent rights not contemplated by the agreements between the parties. Of course, 
this Court has already concluded that an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is an action sounding in contract. Further, because the contracts at issue 
expressly limited Tebbs' and Rex's authority to prepare checks for Guardian employees and 
expressly required Tebbs and Rex to reconcile the payroll accounts, Guardian's assertion of 
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the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case is not an assertion of new and 
independent rights not agreed to between the parties to these contracts. Any preparation of 
checks for anyone besides Guardian employees or not specifically authorized by Guardian 
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Tebbs' and Rex's failure to reconcile 
the accounts and failure to notify Guardian of the unauthorized checks it would have found 
had Tebbs and Rex reconciled the accounts also violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that because the breach of the contract 
was caused by the illegal act of Tebbs' and Rex's employee, the claim was barred by the 
principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of an employee done for the 
employee's sole benefit. The application of this doctrine applies only to negligence actions 
which seek to impose vicarious liability on an employer for the employee's negligence. This 
claim is a breach of contract which seeks only to recover for Tebbs' and Rex's breaches of 
their respective contracts. Thus, the doctrine does not apply in this context. If it did, 
significant mischief would ensue, and innocent contracting parties, who have paid for 
services, would neither be entitled to enforce their contract for services nor to seek 
reimbursement of the consideration they gave for the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
In support of their motions for partial summary judgment below, Rex and Tebbs 
argued that, (1) they did not breach an agreement with Guardian, (2) Guardian's claim is a 
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tort claim, which is barred by Guardian's own negligence, and (3) Guardian's claim is a tort 
claim, which is barred by agency principles. (See R. at 195,198,202.)1 After oral argument, 
the trial court made the following ruling: 
With regard to [the] motion for summary judgment or alternatively, the 
motion in limine, certainly Kilpatrick stands for the proposition that implicit 
in any professional agreement to perform services, such as accounting 
services, is the duty to deal honestly with funds entrusted by a client and 
although this is a . . . contractual action, the court in Kilpatrick made clear that 
the analysis is the same with this duty as it would be in a negligence action. 
And for example, causation or proximate cause, for that matter, must be 
shown. 
And as to the implied covenant of good faith, . . . it appears that this 
does not help [Guardian], as the covenant cannot be construed to imply new 
independent rights not agreed upon by the parties and I'm looking to the 
Nordstrom case for support for that position. 
And—but with regard to this agency issue, Guardian has not suggested 
that Mitchell's acts were undertaken for any benefit but her own. Clearly, on 
the undisputed facts before the Court at this point, that Mitchell's acts—and 
they appear to have been conceded for this argument anyway—that she wrote 
. . . these checks to herself, that she did these solely for her benefit and not for 
the benefit of her employer. 
The principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of an 
employee done for the employee's sole benefit, applies to contract actions as 
well, unless otherwise agreed. 
Accordingly, for these reasons and the other reasons argued, the motion 
for partial summary judgment is granted. 
1
 Both Tebbs and Rex joined Stagg & Associates motion for summary judgment. 
(See R. at 339, 395.) 
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(R. at 464,33-34. A copy of the relevant portions of the transcript of the summary judgment 
hearing are attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum.) Guardian respectfully contends that 
this ruling is severely flawed, and, consequently, the trial court incorrectly granted summary 
judgment to Tebbs and Rex. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IN A CONTRACTUAL ACTION 
AGAINST A PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRM THE ACTION IS TREATED IN ALL 
RESPECTS AS A TORT ACTION 
The first major flaw of the trial court's analysis was that it concluded that it was 
required by Utah common law to apply tort principles to the contractual cause of action 
brought by Guardian against Tebbs and Rex. This faulty premise derives from the trial 
court's apparent misunderstanding of Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). Kilpatrick was a case 
involving a legal malpractice claim, in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant law firm 
had committed legal malpractice by breaching its fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. See id. at 
1289. Although the defendant conceded that there were issues of material fact regarding its 
breach of fiduciary duties, it argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the basis 
ofthe plaintiffs failure to bring forward any evidence of causation. See id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals began its analysis of the causation questions by 
summarizing the general concepts underlying legal malpractice. It very clearly stated that 
"[ljegal malpractice is a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action available to 
clients who suffer damages because of their lawyer's misbehavior. Clients wronged by their 
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lawyers may sue for damages based on breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or 
negligence." Id. After setting forth the reason underlying these causes of action, because the 
issue before it involved distinguishing between a cause of action arising- out of breach of 
fiduciary duty and a cause of action arising out of negligence, the Court began its discussion 
of the conceptual and legal distinctions between a cause of action arising under breach of 
fiduciary duty theories and those arising under negligence theories. See id. at 1290-92. 
Interestingly, as it began its discussion, the Court made the following comment: "While legal 
malpractice actions based on breach of contract are conceptually distinct, legal malpractice 
actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are more difficult to differentiate." 
Id. at 1290 (emphasis added). 
After concluding that breach of a fiduciary duty can give rise to a professional 
malpractice claim, the Court then proceeded to the question of "the standard of causation for 
legal malpractice actions" in the breach of fiduciary duty context. Id. Establishing that for 
the most part the law relating to causation questions had developed "in the context of actions 
based on negligence," the Court then made the following observation: "Although breach of 
fiduciary duty actions concern different wrongs from negligence actions, the same standard 
of causation applies whether the alleged wrong is a negligent act, a fiduciary breach, or even 
a contractual breach." Id. at 1291. 
Despite Kilpatrick's unambiguous language, Tebbs and Rex argued that it supported 
their position that Guardian could assert only a negligence cause of action in a claim against 
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a professional accounting firm. The trial court, taking a slightly different view of the 
argument, ruled that "the court in Kilpatrick made clear that the analysis is the same with [a 
contractual] duty as it would be in a negligence action," (R. at 464, 33). Of course, this 
overly-broad reading of Kilpatrick is incorrect. As described above, Kilpatrick expressly 
stated that a cause of action for breach of contract was "conceptually distinct" from the 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action. Further, its statement regarding 
"the same standard" being applicable to all causes of action applies only to the causation 
analysis. Kilpatrick is clear: there are three theories underlying claims for professional 
malpractice in Utah: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. See 909 
P.2d at 1289. Each cause of action has different elements and gives rise to a different claim. 
See id. at 1290 (stating "legal malpractice actions based on breach of contract are 
conceptually distinct" and "[b]reach of fiduciary duty . . . provides a basis for legal 
malpractice separate and apart from professional negligence").2 
2
 The Kilpatrick conclusion that a distinct cause of action for breach of contract exists 
in professional malpractice cases is in accord with the understanding of other courts and 
commentators. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 627 (Md. 1985); Hutchinson v. 
Smith, All So.2d 926, 927 (Miss. 1982); Dan L. Goldwasser & M. Thomas Arnold, 
Accountants' Liability § 3.1 (1996); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal 
Malpractice § 8.5 (1996); Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort 
and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235,235 (1994). 
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Given the trial court's apparent misunderstanding of controlling Utah law, the trial 
court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires the court to engage in a tort analysis in 
any professional malpractice claim, even those alleged in contract.3 
II. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT AN ACTION FOR BREACH OF 
AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS NECESSARILY BASED 
ON A BREACH OF A TORT DUTY 
Although the trial court apparently concluded that Kilpatrick required it to apply a tort 
analysis to the contractual cause of action, because the trial court's conclusions are not 
precise, one could argue that the trial court actually concluded that what it called an 
accounting firm's "duty to deal honestly with funds entrusted to it" is, in fact, a duty arising 
3
 Given the ambiguity of the trial court's decision, it could be argued that the trial 
court did not ultimately grant summary judgment based on its conclusion that in a 
professional malpractice case a tort analysis must be used rather than a contract analysis. In 
other words, one could say that the trial court granted summary judgment in this case based 
upon its conclusion that the tort doctrine which declares that an employer is not liable in 
respondeat superior for the illegal acts of an employee is also an absolute defense to a breach 
of contract action against an employer. If the Court were to accept this argument, it could 
conceivably reverse the trial court's order by simply concluding that the above-described 
doctrine does not apply to contract causes of action. 
However, Guardian believes that this Court: should address the trial court's conclusion 
that breach of contract causes of action against professionals must be analyzed using a tort 
analysis. The trial court apparently believes that Kilpatrick requires the tort analysis. 
Accordingly, if this Court does not address the issue, the trial court is likely to proceed 
according to its belief that it must analyze this case using a tort's analysis. Of course, doing 
so will have a huge impact on applicable defenses at trial in this matter. Not only would the 
determination of this issue be critical to the defenses applicable on remand to the trial court, 
but, as discussed at some length in Guardian's Docketing Statement, this issue should be 
addressed to clarify the law on this point. Accordingly, if this Court were not to address the 
issue now and the trial court later acted pursuant to its mistaken conclusions regarding the 
law, Guardian would likely appeal yet again. Obviously, Guardian believes resolution of this 
issue now is critical and would promote judicial economy. 
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as a matter of public policy outside the scope of the contract, and, therefore, an action for that 
breach is an allegation of a breach of a standard of care rather than an allegation of a breach 
of contract. This is the position that Tebbs and Rex argued in their motion for summary 
judgment. (See R. at 198-200.) If the Court did, in fact, so conclude, this determination was 
also incorrect. 
Guardian specifically alleges in its Complaint that Tebbs and Rex 
agreed to provide and perform . . . certain professional public accounting 
services. Those services included the preparation of checks made payable to 
[Guardian's] employees and drawn on [Guardian's] bank checking account 
("Payroll Account"), the performance of account statement reconciliation 
services with regard to the Payroll Account, the preparation of payroll tax 
reports and the making of bank deposits of withholding, payroll, social 
security and other taxes as by law required of Plaintiff. . . . 
(R. at 3, 5, fflflO, 22.) Both also "expressly and implicitly covenanted and agreed that [they] 
would charge and commission the performance of. . . services and duties by such of [their] 
employees as would perform the same accurately, properly, competently and with honesty 
and fidelity." (R. at 3,5, f 11, 23.) 
Tebbs and Rex argued that since there was no written contract and no evidence that 
Tebbs and Rex ever made an "express representation of the 'covenant' of fidelity alleged in 
the Complaint," (R. at 196), the covenant to act with honesty and fidelity was an implied 
duty "independently imposed by law," (R. at 196). They argued that because such was an 
independently imposed duty it was not a contractual duty, but a tort duty. Consequently, they 
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continue, Guardian's action is in reality a negligence claim. Despite the earnestness of the 
arguments, they are based on a misapprehension of both Guardian's position and the law. 
A. Contractual Causes of Action vs. Tort Causes of Action 
This Court has engaged in lengthy discussion regarding the differences between 
contractual and tort claims. Citing the California Supreme Court, this Court has explained 
that 
[A] wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual relationship may 
afford both tort and contractual relief.... [IJfthe cause of action arises from 
a breach of a promise set forth in the contract, the action is ex contractu, but 
if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of the contract it is ex delicto. 
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983) (quoting Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980)). In other words, if a wrongdoer's obligation "to 
refrain from" doing a particular act "depend[s] upon any express or implied promise arising 
from the ... contract*" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in contract. 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). If, however, the 
wrongdoer's obligation to refrain from doing a particular act arises from "'a legal duty 
independently imposed as a result of what the [wrongdoer] undertook to do with relation to 
the plaintiffs interest,'" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in tort. 
DCR, 663 P.2d at 437 (quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the 
Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 36). "Thus, when a defendant has 
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undertaken to give professional services gratuitously, liability may be imposed for injuries 
resulting from substandard conduct, even though there is no contract." Id. 
Accordingly, when a party has contracted with a professional for the performance of 
some duty, the professional making a mistake may be liable under several different theories. 
As discussed above, in Utah, the courts have recognized that such wrongdoing may give rise 
to the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of 
fiduciary duty. See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289; see also Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App. 
245, f 15 n.5, 988 P.2d 1 (recognizing three separate causes of action for legal malpractice), 
cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000); Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 
584 P.2d 894, 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (stating "an action for legal 
malpractice may be framed conceptually as either a tort or a breach of contract"). If a 
plaintiff alleges that there was a contract with a professional, there was a material breach of 
an express or implied term of that contract, and damages were caused by that breach, the 
person has alleged a breach of contract. See Goldwasser & Arnold, supra note 2, § 3.2; 
Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, § 8.5; Anderson & Steele, supra note 2, at 245-246. If, on the 
other hand, a plaintiff alleges that the law independently imposed a duty on a defendant a 
result of the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff, and the defendant breached that duty 
causing damages to the defendant, the plaintiff has alleged a negligence cause of action. See 
DCR, 663 P.2d at 437. 
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Given the state of the law, the arguments raised by Tebbs' and Rex's below, that other 
jurisdictions "require a claim for breach of an accountant's professional standards to be 
brought as a negligence or professional malpractice action," are misplaced. (See R. at 198.) 
Utah law clearly recognizes the ability of victims of a professional's bad judgments to sue, 
not only in tort, but also in contract. In this case, Guardian has alleged that (1) when Tebbs 
and Rex failed to pay only Guardian's employees, they failed to fulfill the terms of their 
respective contracts with Guardian, and (2) when Tebbs and Rex failed to disclose that they 
had written and paid unauthorized checks, they failed to fulfill the terms of their respective 
contracts with Guardian. Guardian does not allege that Tebbs' and Rex's respective levels 
of practice fell below a standard of care because they gave Guardian bad accounting advise 
or they failed to supervise their employees or they failed to follow certain accounting 
standards. Guardian alleges only that it had a contract with both Tebbs and Rex to perform 
certain acts, and Tebbs and Rex did not perform those acts or did not perform those acts in 
good faith. See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 409, 420-21 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). Such 
a claim is a breach of contract claim. See Goldwasser & Arnold, supra note 2, § 3.2, at 3-11, 
3-13 ("Accountants may be held liable for breach of contract where they fail to perform a 
specific service which they are committed by contract to perform;" and "an accountant may 
be held liable for failing to perform contractual obligations in a satisfactory manner."); cf. 
Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, § 8.8 ("The client may instruct the attorney to perform certain 
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tasks or to act in a specified manner. The undertaking then becomes contractual in nature, 
and the failure to perform can result in virtual strict liability for any resulting injury.") 
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
As described above, Guardian has alleged that Tebbs and Rex entered into agreements 
with Guardian to provide and perform professional public accounting services, including 
preparation of checks made payable to Guardian's employees and drawn on Guardian's bank 
checking account (Payroll Account) and the performance of account statement reconciliation 
services with regard to the Payroll Account. As discussed above, these facts are undisputed 
and admitted. (See R. at 3, 37, 182-83, 210.) 
Because these contracts were performed in this state, Rex and Tebbs also assumed 
certain unexpressed, constructive contractual duties. "In this state, a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships To comply with [t]his 
obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the 
agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St. Benedicts Dev. 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,199-200 (Utah 1991); see also PDQ Lube Center\ 
Inc. v. Ruber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In other words, "the parties to a 
contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract should be construed in a manner 
which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created by the contract should 
be performed... in good faith" Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) 
(emphasis added); PDQ, 949 P.2d at 798. The Utah Supreme Court has unambiguously held 
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that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "'is read into contracts in order 
to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some general 
public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purpose."' Peterson v. Browning, 832 
P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 
(Cal. 1988)); see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). 
Hence, this Court has expressly concluded that "a violation of th[e] duty [of good faith and 
fair dealing] gives rise to a claim for breach of contract" Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 (emphasis 
added); see also St. Benedicts, 811 P.2d at 200. 
Therefore, according to Utah law, implied in Rex's and Tebbs' contracts with 
Guardian were duties to perform their services in a way that complied with the agreed 
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party. A breach of that duty gave 
rise to a breach of contract. 
Guardian has alleged such a breach. Guardian has alleged and it is undisputed that 
Rex and Tebbs agreed that they would prepare checks to pay those persons on Guardian's 
payroll. Guardian did not expect that they would write checks to individuals not on 
Guardian's payroll nor did it expect that they would not disclose to Guardian that Rex and 
Tebbs had so written and caused to be paid such unauthorized checks. Thus, Rex and Tebbs 
did not act within the agreed common purpose of the contract or according to Guardian's 
justified expectations, nor did Rex and Tebbs perform their duties under the contract in good 
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faith. Accordingly, Guardian has alleged that Rex and Tebbs breached their contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to perform those duties. 
Relying on Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), the trial court further 
concluded that an implied covenant could not be construed into Guardian's respective 
contracts with Rex and Tebbs because to do so would be "to imply new independent rights 
not agreed upon by the parties." (R. at 464, 34.) This determination is also incorrect. 
Brehany involved an employee's attempt to claim that, because Utah imposed upon every 
contract a duty of good faith, an at-will employment contract now required that an employer 
"show that [a] discharge is made in good faith" before discharging an employee. Id. at 55. 
Rejecting the argument, this Court noted: 
Under the implied covenant of good faith applied in Resource Management, 
the parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract 
should be construed in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the 
duties and rights created by the contract should be performed and exercised in 
good faith. Such a covenant cannot be construed, however, to establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. Nor can a 
covenant of good faith be used to nullify a right granted by a contract to one 
of the parties or to require a party vested with a contract right to exercise that 
right in a manner contrary to that party's legitimate self-interest. 
Id. at 55. Thus, according to Brehany, if a party asserts the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in a way that would (1) create new rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties, 
(2) nullify a right granted by a contract, or (3) require a party with a contractual right to 
exercise it in a manner contrary to that party's interests, that assertion of the implied duty is 
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improper. In Brehany, the plaintiff attempted to do just that—change an at-will employment 
contract to a termination-for-cause contract. 
In this case, Guardian has not attempted to create new independent rights. As 
discussed above, the assertion of the covenant merely would hold Tebbs and Rex accountable 
for their failure to perform the contract pursuant to its terms. The assertion of the covenant 
does not give Guardian any new rights—Guardian already had the right to have only its 
employees paid and its bank statements reconciled; and Tebbs and Rex already had the duty 
to assure that only Guardian employees were paid and the bank statements reconciled 
pursuant to the contract. The assertion of the covenant does not nullify any right that Tebbs 
or Rex can assert—Tebbs and Rex never had authority to pay anyone besides Guardian 
employees, to permit its employees to take Guardian's money, or to fail to reconcile 
statements. Finally, the assertion of the covenant does not require Tebbs and Rex to exercise 
any rights they have in a manner contrary to their interests. 
The only way that the trial court's conclusion that independent rights were created 
makes any sense is if the law imposes no duty upon contracting parties to deal with other 
contracting parties with honesty and fidelity in fulfilling the terms of the contract. To so 
hold, of course, would be to entirely undermine the constructive covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, which requires that "a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed 
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St Benedicts Dev. Co., 
811 P.2d at 199-200. 
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The trial court's conclusions (1) that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a tort duty and/or (2) that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to add new, independent terms to the contract are, therefore; incorrect.4 
III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TORT DOCTRINE THAT 
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT LIABLE IN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ILLEGAL ACT OF 
AN EMPLOYEE IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION 
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER 
In the trial court, Tebbs and Rex argued that they were also entitled to summary 
judgment because, although they agreed "that principals are bound by the acts of their 
agents," "illegal acts by an employee, for the sole benefit and purpose of the employee and 
not the employer, are not within the actual or apparent scope of authority." (R. at 411.) 
Accordingly, they continued, they could not "be liable for such illegal acts." (Id.) The trial 
court agreed, stating that "[t]he principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of 
an employee done for the employee's sole benefit, applies to contract actions as well, unless 
otherwise agreed." (R. at 464, 34.) 
The trial court's conclusion was based upon an incorrect understanding of the law and 
Guardian's arguments. Guardian's sole contention is that Tebbs and Rex breached the terms 
of their contracts with Guardian when they failed to pay only Guardian employees and when 
4
 The resolution of this issue is subject to the same caveat discussed in footnote 3. 
One could argue that the trial court's conclusions regarding the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing were not the basis of its order granting summary judgment. Just as 
discussed in footnote 3, however, this Court's resolution of the question will have a huge 
impact at the trial of this matter. Accordingly, Guardian believes that this issue is of critical 
importance and should be addressed. 
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they failed to reconcile bank statements. Thus, the question before the trial court was fairly 
straightforward: Did Tebbs and Rex breach their contracts by failing to pay only Guardian 
employees and failing to reconcile bank statement? 
There is no dispute that Tebbs and Rex had contracts with Guardian. There is no 
dispute that the terms of those contracts included Tebbs' and Rex's obligation to prepare 
checks for Guardian for Guardian's distribution to Guardian employees, for accounting 
services on the payroll accounts, and reconciliation services. There is no dispute that 
Guardian sent a listing of employees to be paid out of the payroll account, and that Tebbs and 
Rex were required to prepare checks for the employees on the list. There is no dispute that 
Guardian paid for those services. Thus, Tebbs and Rex had contractual duties to Guardian 
to perform those services. Tebbs and Rex also had a duty of good faith and fair dealing to 
perform the contract in such a way that was consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
Guardian's justified expectations. 
In this case, there is no dispute that during the period of time Rex and Tebbs were 
contractually obligated to Guardian, thirty-eight checks were written to Stacey Howell 
without authorization by Guardian. Accordingly, during that time, although Rex and Tebbs 
were contractually obligated to prepare checks only for Guardian to distribute to Guardian 
employees, Rex and Tebbs permitted the preparation of thirty-eight checks without authority 
to do so. They also failed to account for the writing of those checks written or to notify 
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Guardian that those checks had been written. This was a clear breach of the terms of the 
agreement and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This is Guardian's sole claim. 
Rex and Tebbs, however, asserted that because the actions of the person who caused 
its breach, its employee Mitchell, were outside of the scope of her employment, Rex and 
Tebbs are not liable. In support of this position, they cited cases that state that an employer 
is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the activities of its employees that 
are not within the scope of the employee's employment. See Birkner v. Salt Lake County», 
771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989) (employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for its 
employee's sexual assault of patient); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 
1263-64 (Utah 1979) (employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for employee's 
misappropriation of trust funds)5; Sweatman v. Linton, 241 P. 309, 310 (Utah 1925) 
(employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for its employee's malicious 
prosecution); Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995); Los Ranchitos v. Tierra 
Grande, Inc., 861 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). Although the cases stand for the general 
propositions asserted, they do not resolve the issue before this Court. 
The doctrine of respondeat superior is a tort doctrine under which an employer can 
be held 'Vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an employee." Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 
37, V, 980 P.2d 268. 
5
 The Court in Wells, where the victim of misappropriation of trust funds sued the 
employee under only a tort theory and employer under respondeat superior theory, ruled that 
the employer would be liable if the facts as alleged were true. See Wells, 590 P.2d at 1264. 
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The policy objectives given for implementing vicarious liability under this 
theory "are to prevent the recurrence of tortious conduct, to give greater 
assurance of compensation for the victim, and to ensure that the victim's losses 
will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise 
to the injury." It is also generally believed that an employer is best able to 
control the conduct of an employee. 
Id. (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 459 (1996)). Apparently because 
these policies are not served as well, or are overridden by competing concerns, employers 
are vicariously liable only for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope 
of their employment. See id. W 8-19. 
Guardian is not claiming that it should be reimbursed under tort doctrines of 
respondeat superior. In other words, Guardian is not asking that Tebbs ar T Rex be held 
liable in tort for Ms. Mitchell's tortious and criminal acts. It is asking only for damages for 
the breach of the contracts Rex and Tebbs made with Guardian Title to prepare and reconcile 
its payroll accounts and to prepare its payroll checks. Guardian simply claims that there were 
contracts between Guardian and Rex and Tebbs and that those contracts were breached. 
"Whether [the breach] was due to personal fault of the [accountants] themselves or to that 
of employees working for them is not material. As in other like situations, public 
accountants are liable for the failure of their subordinates [to perform the contract]." Board 
of County Comm'rs v. Baker, 102 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Kan. 1940). 
The trial court's decision means that the following premise is true: if an employer 
breaches a contract with a person because of its employee's illegal acts, the person damaged 
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by the breach has no cause of action against the employer for the breach of contract. This 
is obviously not the law. Even if that were the law, the mischief created by such a rule would 
be enormous. 
For instance, suppose that Attorney Carefree has entered into a retainer agreement to 
represent Client Lamb in the sale of a large real estate development. A check for the contract 
price is sent to Carefree while Lamb is out of town on a vacation. Carefree and Lamb have 
agreed that Swindle will hold the proceeds of the sale in his firm's trust account until Lamb 
returns to the country after his vacation. Carefree asks Mr. Swindle, an attorney at Mr. 
Carefree's law firm with signatory authority on the trust account, to deposit the check for 
him. After Swindle deposits the check, without Carefree's knowledge, he writes himself a 
check for the entire amount in the trust account and flees to Switzerland. When Lamb returns 
and asks for his money, Carefree says he does not have it and cannot give it to him. Under 
the trial court's analysis, Lamb has no cause of action for breach of contract against Carefree. 
Another example: Suppose Kim goes to a fast food restaurant and orders a 
hamburger. The cashier asks for two dollars. Kim gives him the two dollars and the cashier 
proceeds to go to the back of the restaurant and out the back door with the money. Kim, 
wondering where his hamburger is, asks the manager. The manager says that the cashier has 
disappeared and that he must have taken the money. When Kim asks for his hamburger, the 
manager refuses to give it to him. According to the trial court, Kim has no claim against the 
restaurant for the hamburger or the two dollars. 
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Finally, suppose Storage, Inc., owns warehouses and provides storage space for its 
customers to store various items. As part of its services, it agrees to provide security to 
safekeep the property. Handy contracts with Storage to store his tools in one of Storage's 
warehouses in exchange for his payment of $2,000 per month. Handy pays his monthly 
payment promptly. During the time Handy stores his tools with Storage, without Storage's 
knowledge, one of its employees steals half of Handy's items. Handy asks for 
reimbursement for the items. Storage refuses to reimburse him. According to the trial court, 
Handy has no claim against Storage for breach of contract. 
These examples illustrate the folly of the trial court's decision. In each of these cases, 
a person or corporation contracted to provide a particular good or service. In order to fulfill 
the terms of the contract, the entity used an employee to perform the services or to deliver 
the goods. The employee engaged in a tortious, criminal act, which resulted in the breach 
of the contract the employer had entered into with an innocent third party. There is no 
question that the contract had been breached in each of these instances, the only question is 
whether, because the criminal act of an employee was the cause of the breach, the employer 
is excused from performance of the contract. The trial court's answer is that such a breach 
is excused and that the third party, who had nothing to do with the employment of the 
employee, is entitled to neither damage for the foreseeable effects of such breach nor return 
of the contract price. 
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Although not directly addressing the issue in this case, Horrocks v. Westfalia 
Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), shows that such outcomes are inconsistent with 
contract and agency law. In Horrocks, Westfalia, a dairy equipment manufacturer, employed 
Buchanan as its sales representative in Utah. Id. at 15. Buchanan, acting as Westfalia's 
agent, entered into a contract with Horrocks to supply milking equipment for the payment 
of $14,000. Id. at 14. Horrocks paid the $14,000 but received only a portion of the milking 
equipment, although he signed an acknowledgment stating that he had received all of it. Id. 
at 15. Horrocks signed the acknowledgment without reading it after Buchanan presented it 
to him, requested he sign it, and told Horrocks that the equipment would be delivered at a 
later date. Id. Buchanan sent the acknowledgment to Westfalia, who then delivered the 
$14,000 to him. Id. After receiving the money, Buchanan left town, taking the equipment 
and cash with him. Id. The question before the court of appeals was whether Westfalia 
breached a contract it had entered with Horrocks. In answer, the court stated: 
First, Buchanan represented to Horrocks that he was acting as Westfalia's 
agent. Westfalia made a similar representation to Horrocks by ratifying 
Buchanan's actions. Westfalia allowed Buchanan to travel in a car bearing the 
Westfalia insignia. In addition, Westfalia supplied the documentation for the 
milking equipment contract, including the Acknowledgment form. Moreover, 
Westfalia accepted and cashed Horrock's down payment check. Perhaps most 
importantly, Westfalia failed to give Horrocks notice of any limitations on 
Buchanan's authority. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Horrock 
to believe Buchanan's statement that if he signed the Acknowledgment, the 
remainder of the equipment would be forthcoming. The loss that results from 
Buchanan's misconduct must be borne by the party who empowered Buchanan 
to commit the wrong [i.e., the principal]. "Where a loss is to be suffered 
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in 
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his power to do the wrong." Westfalia placed Buchanan in the position to 
perpetrate a fraud. Consequently, Westfalia must bear the responsibility for 
Buchanan's misconduct. The trial court did not err by placing liability on 
Westfalia under the theory of apparent authority. 
Id. at 16 (quotations omitted). 
This case is analogous. Although in this case there is no question that Rex and Tebbs 
had contracts with Guardian (the question of an agent's authority to bind a party, therefore, 
not being at issue), the principle enunciated in Horrocks still applies—Where a loss is to be 
suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it should be bome by those who empowered her 
to do the wrong. In this case, there is no question that Guardian suffered a loss through the 
misconduct of Tebbs' and Rex's agent. Tebbs aad Rex employed Ms. Mitchell to perform 
the work they had contracted with Guardian to perform. Because Tebbs and Rex placed Ms. 
Mitchell in the position to perpetrate the misconduct, Tebbs and Rex must bear the 
responsibility for Ms. Mitchell's misconduct. 
Further, when the trial court's decision is analyzed next to other principles of law, 
there can be no question that the trial court erred. It is axiomatic, for instance, that "a party 
who delegates his duties under a contract to a third person is not relieved of his 
responsibilities, but rather remains ultimately responsible to the party with whom he 
contracted for guaranteeing the successful execution of the contractual duties." First 
American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Sav. Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 
1987). Accordingly, assuming that Mitchell were not Rex's and Tebbs' employee but instead 
were an independent contractor, if Tebbs and Rex had assigned their duties under their 
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contracts with Guardian to Mitchell and she then breached, they would be liable to Guardian 
for her breach of that contract. For the trial court's conclusion to make sense, the law of 
delegation would have to be that if a delegee's breach was precipitated by the delegee's 
intentional criminal act the delegor is excused from his or her ultimate responsibility. No 
case of which Guardian is aware has ever taken this position. In the hypothetical scenario 
imagined above, Tebbs and Rex would be liable to Guardian regardless of the reason for 
Mitchell's breach. There is no reason to distinguish the employee scenario from that of the 
independent contractor. 
The trial court's conclusion that Tebbs and Rex were not liable for breach of contract 
because the act constituting the breach was an illegal act committed by its employee was 
incorrect. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that Tebbs and Rex were entitled to 
judgment was also incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires any action brought against 
a professional accounting firm must be treated in all respects as a negligence cause of action. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that an action for the breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is one sounding in tort. Moreover, the trial court incorrectly 
concluded that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to add 
new, independent terms to the contract. Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that 
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Tebbs and Rex were not liable in breach of contract for breaches of contract caused by an 
illegal act committed by an employee. 
Accordingly, Guardian respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order granting 
summary judgment to Tebbs and Rex and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this of June, 2001. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Gary A. Weston 
D. Scott Crook 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Guardian Title 
Company of Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
A. ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
B. STIPULATED JUDGMENT 
C. ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
D. TRANSCRIPT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING 
Tab A 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512) 
Attorneys for Defendant Stagg & Associates 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
 ny. 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STACEY MITCHELL, formerly known as 
STACEY HOWELL, an individual; 
TEBBS & SMITH P.C, a Utah 
corporation; DOUGLAS L. REX, an 
individual; and STAGG & ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 990904087 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
This case came on for hearing on October 25, 2000, at 8:30 a.m. on all pending 
motions. The Honorable Anne M. Stirba presided. Gary A. Weston and D. Scott Crook 
appeared on behalf of Guardian Title Company of Utah. Douglas T. Hall appeared on behalf 
of Tebbs & Smith, P.C. ("Tebbs & Smith"). Michael F. Jones appeared on behalf of Douglas 
L. Rex. Stephen K. Christiansen appeared on behalf of Stagg & Associates. Stacey Mitchell 
did not appear. 
M70T 
The Court heard oral argument from counsel on the pending motions, issued bench 
rulings on those motions, and directed counsel for Stagg & Associates to prepare and circulate 
a proposed form of order. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and all relevant law, having considered the argument 
of counsel, being fully informed in the matter, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby 
enters the following Order: 
1. Stagg & Associates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED for 
the reasons advanced by Stagg & Associates. Stagg & Associates' Motion in Limine is 
therefore rendered MOOT. 
2. Plaintiffs motions to strike the Joinders of Tebbs & Smith and Douglas L. Rex 
in Stagg & Associates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED. The Court 
grants summary judgment to Tebbs & Smith, and Douglas L. Rex as requested by each of 
them on the same grounds and for the same reasons articulated in connection with Stagg & 
Associates' motion. 
3. Douglas L. Rex's Motion for Summary Judgment on Tebbs & Smith's cross-
claim is GRANTED. Tebbs & Smith's "Objection" is not a proper response to a summary 
judgment motion and is overruled in any event because Tebbs & Smith's indemnity cross-
claim is precluded by the Utah Liability Reform Act as interpreted by governing case law. 
;2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this \b day of I Kh *>Cf r \0 ( r ev^ 
ByNiM^-^-g-
ANNEM. STIRBA 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF ] 
UTAH, a corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
VS. , 
STACEY MITCHELL, formerly known as ; 
STACEY HOWELL; TEBBS & SMITH ; 
P.C., a corporation; DOUGLAS L. REX; ; 
STAGG & ASSOCIATES, a corporation, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 STIPULATED JUDGMENT AGAINST 
) DEFENDANT STACEY MITCHELL 
) Civil No. 990904087 
) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Based on that certain Stipulation Directed at Plaintiffs Claims Against Stacey Mitchell 
and Stagg & Associates dated March 12, 2001, and the agreement therein made by Plaintiff and 
Defendant, Stacey Mitchell, for entry of a stipulated judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
said Defendant, and good cause appearing therefor, 
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IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Guardian Title 
Company of Utah, have and recover from Defendant, Stacey Mitchell, the amount of $23,000, 
with interest thereon from date hereof at the rate provided in Section 15-1-4(3), UTAH CODE 
ANN. 
DATED this / p day of March, 2001. 
Approved as to Form: 
FABIAN & CLEND 
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Michael F. Jones, Esq. 
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One Utah Center, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Todd C. Emerson, Esq. 
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the crossclaim of Stagg & Associates against Stacey Mitchell and the claims therein made should 
be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this - ^ day of March, 2001. 
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DOUGLAS L. REX and STAGG & 
ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 990904087 
MOTION 
(Videotape Proceedings1 
FILED DISTRICT COUif 
Th:-n indicia! District 
NOV 2 8 2000 
SALT LAKE 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of 
October, 2000, commencing at the hour of 8:38 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
e^Hty^jam 
For the Plaintiff: GARY A. WESTON 
D. SCOTT CROOK 
Attorneys at Law 
Nielsen & Senior 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza 
& Office Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1019 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
considered those, the various cases that seem pivotal and 
the arguments on counsel and I'm prepared to rule on these 
issues this morning. 
First of all, with their motion, with his motion, 
Rex argues that Tebbs may not maintain an indemnity action 
against him because it's prohibited by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-27-37 through 38—through 78-27-43 and because 
of the National Services Industries, Inc. case. 
Specifically, what Rex is—is arguing, is that 
the Utah Liability Reform Act has abolished claims for 
indemnity. 
Now, Tebbs has opposed the motion on the ground 
that the act would only preclude a separate action brought 
by Tebbs against Rex, after an earlier case found some 
liability on the part of Tebbs. 
Is that a fair summary of your argument? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I would note at first, 
Tebbs argued in writing, in a document entitled "Objection" 
as opposed to a "Memorandum in Opposition" to a motion—to 
a motion for summary judgment and of course, there is a—a 
concern expressed. First, that the objection that was 
filed does not contain a statement of uncontested or 
statement of undisputed facts or disputed facts as required 
by 4-501 and should not even be considered by the Court. 
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And that is a valid contention against the—the document 
actually filed. 
And for that reason, the objection should be 
overruled. Under the circumstances, I did look also to the 
merits of the claim, however, and for that reason, and 
based on—on the law before the Court and the undisputed 
facts, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
The—the cross-claim contains only one cause of 
action, a claim for indemnity and despite the con—the 
claims to the contrary, this indemnity action is clearly 
precluded by Utah—by the Utah Liability Reform Act as set 
forth in the National Securities Industries. Inc. case. 
Accordingly, in that—for that reason, summary judgment is 
appropriate. 
With regard to Stagg's motion for summary 
judgment or alternatively, the motion in limine, certainly 
Kilpatrick stands for the proposition that implicit in any 
professional agreement to perform services, such as 
accounting services, is the duty to deal honestly with 
funds entrusted by a client and although this is a con—a 
contractual action, the court in Kilpatrick made clear that 
the analysis is the same with this duty as it would be in a 
negligence action. And for example, causation or proximate 
cause, for that matter, must be shown. 
And as to the implied covenant of good faith, it-
33 
-it appears that this does not help the plaintiff, as the 
covenant cannot be construed to imply new independent 
rights not agreed upon by the parties and I'm looking to 
the Nordstrom case for support for that position. 
And—but with regard to this agency issue, 
Guardian has not suggested that Mitchell's acts were 
undertaken for any benefit but her own. Clearly, on the 
undisputed facts before the Court at this point, that 
Mitchell's acts—and they appear to have been conceded for 
this argument anyway—that she wrote this—wrote these 
checks to herself, that she did these solely for her 
benefit and not for the benefit of her employer. 
The principle that an employer is not liable for 
the illegal acts of an employee done for the employee's 
sole benefit, applies to contract actions as well, unless 
otherwise agreed. 
It appears that these—and—and—nor has Guardian 
contended that Mitchell's acts were done within the scope 
of her duties for the—for her employer. 
Accordingly, for these reasons and the other 
reasons argued, the motion for partial summary judgment is 
granted. 
This makes the motion in limine moot. 
I would also indicate for the record, the 
plaintiff has moved to strike both the joinder of—and also 
34 
Tebbs' motion, arguing that they were filed after the 
scheduling order cut-off. The scheduling order says what 
it says, there was no request for consideration of the— 
these motions beyond time and—and so they were filed 
untimely. 
Let's see, I believe I've covered everything. 
Are there any questions about my rulings or the 
reasons for them? 
MR. HALL: With—yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, with regard—oh— 
THE COURT: What? 
MR. HALL: Well— 
THE COURT: Mr. Hall? 
MR. HALL: —your—your Honor, you—you granted 
the motions to strike then; is that what I understand? 
THE COURT: Correct. Correct. 
MR. HALL: All right. So that leaves Rex and 
Tebbs in the case— 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
MR. HALL: —but not— 
THE COURT: I see, yes. 
MR. HALL: —Staggs. 
THE COURT: Well, all right. However—well, I—I 
see your point. 
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I actually—technically, that is the—the—the— 
you know, when I consider the argument about failing to 
file timely; however, in this case, because although the 
plaintiff did not respond to the facts of each defendant 
individually, the same principles would be addressed 
regardless. And so for that reason, I—I'm going to 
reverse myself. I see the problem. 
As to Tebbs' motion for partial summary judgment, 
I'm going to deny the motion to strike—excuse me, I'm 
going to deny the motion to strike because the plaintiff, 
although the plaintiff did not respond to the facts of each 
defendant individually, the same principles would be 
addressed and—and resolved the same way. So, I—I reverse 
myself on that. 
So, I'm denying the motion to strike, granting 
the cross-claim defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
granting Stagg's motion for—for summary judgment. The 
motion in limine is moot. I think that clears it up. 
Yes? Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'm—I'm still unclear. 
My client has joined in Stagg's motion and—and has made— 
and we have made the same motion on behalf of Mr. Rex as 
Stagg has, by way of our joinder. And then in turn, Mr. 
Hall has made the same motion on behalf of Tebbs & Smith. 
So, my question is whether the Court is granting 
36 
our motions as well? 
THE COURT: I am. I am. For the reasons I 
indicated and I—I apologize for the ambiguity.-
Mr. Weston? 
MR. WESTON: Your Honor, so that the plaintiff 
might understand now, is the Court's ruling then that we go 
to trial in this case against the defendants on a tort 
claim or is the ruling that we don't go to trial against 
them at all? 
THE COURT: Well, I had--I don't think there's a 
tort claim pleaded. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, as I understand 
it, we excluded one part of the existing claim from our 
motion. I believe that's still on the table and that is 
with respect to— 
THE COURT: To the payroll tax reports? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Correct. Other than that, I 
understand that— 
THE COURT: And— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: —the remaining issues have 
been ruled on as a matter of law and dismissed. 
THE COURT: All right. So, what has not been 
decided is—is—are claims involving the preparation of the 
payroll tax reports, the deposits of payroll, Social 
Security and other taxes. Is there any other aspect of 
37 
this that I'm missing? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: All right. So— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Those your Honor directed only 
as to the defendant, Stagg & Associates, not at the other 
two defendants. 
THE COURT: Right. That's why, although you are 
technically correct that they were filed—their responses 
were filed beyond the—the scheduling order cut-off and 
ordinarily, I'd—I'd go with that; but in this case, given-
-given the other rulings, I'm going to permit consideration 
of the late filings and deny your motions to strike or to 
oppose the joinder in the motion, and thus, they are 
removed from the case. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: So then is our understanding 
that the Court has therefore dismissed all of the 
plaintiff's claims with the exception of the claim against 
Stagg & Associates having to do with the payroll accounts 
reconciliation, the deposit and the tax deposits? 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: I believe that's— 
MR. WESTON: I don't think the payroll account, 
that's not accurate. No, the payroll taxes, there's a— 
there's a separate issue with respect to— 
MR. HALL: Against all— 
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MR. WESTON: —the proper payment of payroll 
taxes, that's all (inaudible) the statutes. 
THE COURT: Do you agree with that, Mr. Weston— 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: —based on my ruling? 
MR. WESTON: Yes. Yeah. Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WESTON: So, the Court has ruled therefore 
that the defendants are dismissed out of the case, Tebbs & 
Smith and—and Doug Rex are dismissed out, Stagg is out 
except with regard to the payroll tax deposit issue? 
THE COURT: That is correct. 
MR. WESTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: That is correct. All right. 
Mr. Christiansen, I'm going to have you prepare 
an order consistent with these rulings. 
I'm sorry about my con—confusing the issues at 
the end but I think we're clear now and the—the impact of 
these rulings and are there any other questions? 
I thank you gentlemen very much. Those are the 
rulings today. 
Mr. Christiansen, I look forward to your proposed 
order, after you've submitted it to Counsel. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
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